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Elections in post-conflict societies
Benjamin Reilly
Elections have become an integral element of many UN peacekeeping
missions over the past decade. The reason for this is clear: the focus of
most UN missions has shifted from one of pure peace-building to one of
state rebuilding or, in some cases like East Timor, state creation. In such
cases, elections provide an inescapable means for jump-starting a new
post-conflict political order; for stimulating the development of demo-
cratic politics; for choosing representatives; for forming governments;
and for conferring legitimacy upon the new political order. They also
provide a clear signal that legitimate domestic authority has been re-
turned – and hence that the role of the international community may be
coming to an end. For all of these reasons, elections have become a cen-
tral part of many UN peacekeeping missions. In addition, electoral assis-
tance outside peacekeeping missions has become something of a growth
industry since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the ‘‘third wave’’ of democ-
ratization have led to a threefold increase in the number of putatively
democratic governments around the globe.
Despite this, there has been a considerable variation in the relative
success of elections in meeting the broader goals of democratization from
country to country and case to case. In some cases, such as Namibia and
Mozambique, elections clearly played a vital role in making a decisive
break with the past. In others, such as Angola, flawed elections created
more problems than they solved. In Haiti administrative inefficiencies
undermined the credibility of the broader electoral process. By contrast,
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in Cambodia technically successful electoral processes were soon over-
whelmed by the realities of power politics. And in Bosnia premature
elections helped to kick-start the façade of democratic politics, but also
helped nationalist parties cement an early grip on political power. While
this mistake has been avoided in Kosovo and East Timor, it is still to be
seen how elections influence the process of peace-building in these post-
conflict societies, and in other cases like Afghanistan.
What is clear, however, is that in any UN mission the holding of elec-
tions forces critical political choices to be made. Elections represent a
key step in a broader process of building political institutions and legit-
imate government. Elections influence to what extent the internal politics
of fragile new states become stabilized, whether the new political dis-
pensation comes to be viewed as legitimate, and how the rhythm of
peaceful democratic politics can evolve and become sustainable. Varia-
tions in electoral procedures can also play a key role in determining
whether the locus of political competition evolves along extremist or
centrist lines, and in the development of fractionalized versus broad-
based political parties.
There are three main areas of variation in electoral processes which
influence the shape of post-conflict politics in most countries. First, there
is the question of timing: should post-conflict elections be held as early as
possible, so as to fast-track the process of establishing a new regime? Or
should they be postponed until peaceful political routines and issues have
been able to come to prominence? Second, there are the mechanics of
elections themselves. Who runs the elections? How are voters enrolled?
What electoral formula is used? And so on. Third, there is the often un-
derestimated issue of the effect of the elections on political parties. Es-
pecially in cases of weak civil society, political parties are the key link
between masses and élites, and play an absolutely crucial role in building
a sustainable democratic polity. Hence, the interaction between parties
and the electoral process is itself crucial. Are the political parties contest-
ing the election narrow, personalized, sectarian, or ethnically exclusive
entities, using the political process to pursue their wartime objectives? Or
are they broad, multi-ethnic, programmatic organizations with real links
to the community? And how can the former be discouraged and the
latter promoted?
More generally, there is the overarching issue of under what circum-
stances elections help to build a new democratic order, and under what
circumstances they can undermine democracy and pave the way for a re-
turn to conflict. As one survey of post-conflict elections notes, the high
expectations often put on post-conflict elections tend to be accompanied
by a weakness in the preconditions for their success: ‘‘most war-torn
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societies lack the political climate, social and economic stability, institu-
tional infrastructure, and even political will to mount successful elec-
tions’’.1 There is also a deeper issue: while elections are an essential step
in building a functioning democracy, ill-timed, badly designed, or poorly
run elections can actually undermine the broader process of democra-
tization. This overarching theme is the subject of this chapter.
Timing
As a starting point, the issue of election timing is a crucial – and under-
appreciated – variable in election planning. Issues of timing also directly
affect administrative choices, electoral system designs, and the way polit-
ical parties form. In some cases, timing demands – particularly the need
to hold a quick election – have influenced the choice of electoral laws,
and these have affected not just the party system but also the broader
incentives presented to political actors as part of the election process.
This was the case in Angola’s abortive 1992 presidential elections, held
under the Bicesse Accord aimed at stopping Angola’s long-running civil
war. The major parties contesting the election were the political wings of
two former liberation-movements-turned-armies: the governing MPLA,
led by President Eduardo Dos Santos, and UNITA, led by Jonas Sa-
vimbi. Due to the extraordinary nature of the election (the first ever held
in Angola) and severe timing pressures, a hastily drafted electoral law
was enacted which included, as part of the presidential election, a run-off
between the top two candidates if no one gained a majority in the first
round of voting.
This choice of formula had two impacts: first, it precluded any possi-
bility of power-sharing between the two main combatants, as the election
itself could only be won by one candidate. Second, it provided an escape
hatch for parties weakly committed to the process, which could get an
indication of their support levels after the first round of voting. When
Savimbi realized after the first round that he was unlikely to win the
election, he rejected the election and went back to war. The issues of
timing and electoral system choice thus impacted directly on the overall
failure of the Bicesse peace process in Angola. Of course, it is possible
that this may have occurred anyway. But the design of the electoral sys-
tem clearly presented strategic opportunities for candidates to remove
themselves from the contest – an incentive that would have been lesser
under a different set of institutional rules.
Such events may suggest that democracy itself is part of the problem in
such highly fraught situations, and that post-conflict situations are too
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fragile to be exposed to the competitive pressures of the electoral pro-
cess. But this oft-heard critique ignores several factors. First, elections
can be purposively designed to encourage not winner-takes-all outcomes,
but the sharing of power between groups. Indeed, many would argue that
some form of power-sharing is a primary requirement in post-conflict sit-
uations. Second, critics of elections as instruments of democratization
often ignore the real need to construct a legitimate governing authority in
post-conflict circumstances. Not least because so many of today’s conflicts
take place within states, the overarching challenge of many UN missions
is to build or rebuild a sustainable democratic state that can function
without direct international involvement. Elections are a crucial element
in achieving this. State-building is a priority issue for UN missions in
Afghanistan, Kosovo, and East Timor, for example, where the UN mis-
sions are confronted with the challenges of attempting to build function-
ing democracies in societies only recently ravaged by violent conflict.
One valid criticism of elections in post-conflict scenarios, however, is
that if held too early they can undermine the nascent democratic order.
This has been a fundamental problem of many UN-supervised elections:
they have been held too soon and too quickly after peace has been re-
stored. In fact, over the last decade UN peacekeeping missions appear to
have developed a kind of standard operating procedure. Once a mini-
mum level of peace has been obtained (which does not necessarily mean
a full cease-fire agreement), and a basic level of infrastructure is in place,
the next step is usually to hold some kind of elections – often within a
year or two of the start of the mission – followed by a rapid hand-over to
the newly elected authorities and an even more rapid departure of UN
troops and personnel. This results in pressure to hold elections as quickly
as possible, regardless of whether existing social conditions are conducive
to the cut and thrust of open electoral politics or not.
But if held too early, elections in fragile situations can easily under-
mine the longer-term challenge of building a sustainable democracy.
Elections in conflictual situations can act as catalysts for the development
of parties and other organizations which are primarily (and often solely)
vehicles to assist local élites in gaining access to governing power. They
can promote a focus on regional, rather than national, issues. They can
serve to place in positions of elected authority leaders committed to ex-
clusionary visions of the country – leaders who are, in many cases, the
very same ones who started or fought the conflict in the first place. This
generals-to-politicians transformation has been a recurring problem in
the Balkans, where nationalist parties and élites have attempted to use
the political process to continue to press their sectarian aims. Early elec-
tions also tend to elicit more extreme reactions from voters than an elec-
tion held after a period of state rebuilding. This is one of the perverse
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realities of post-conflict elections: the sine qua non of the democratic
process, elections, can also be its undoing.
This appears to be one area where there has been some genuine
learning over time by the United Nations. In contrast to Bosnia, Angola,
and a range of other rushed elections, in Kosovo, East Timor, and now
Afghanistan pressure to hold instant national elections has been resisted.
Instead, a two-year period of political development has been used to
prepare the ground for elections as part of the much longer process of
democratization. In both Kosovo and East Timor, relatively peaceful na-
tional elections were held in the second half of 2001. In Afghanistan, the
two-year time-frame is being used again. Although questions remain as
to whether even two years is time enough, there is now little doubt about
the benefits of this more gradual approach.
Election timing also has other implications. For example, timing con-
siderations impact directly on the shape of the political party system. A
major goal in democracy-building should be the creation of parties which
are broad-based, have strong links to local communities, and campaign
on a national platform. But in post-conflict situations many political par-
ties are not broad-based vehicles for presenting competing policy and
ideological platforms, but rather narrowly focused, personalized, élite
cartels. In other cases, political movement are often merely thinly dis-
guised variants of the armies which fought in the original conflicts, as ex-
emplified in Bosnia by the growth of nationalist parties like the (Croat)
HDZ, (Serb) SDS, and (Bosniac) SDA, respectively. This problem also
afflicts former liberation movements, such as East Timor’s Fretilin or
the Kosovo Liberation Army, which attempt to transform themselves
into mainstream political organizations. Either way, holding elections too
early in the transition period can have the perverse effect of stymieing
the development of more aggregative and programmatic political parties
– institutions which are now widely accepted to be important facilitating
agents for successful democratization.
A second issue is the coordination of election timing with sub-national
elections, and hence the degree of coordination between local and na-
tional-level élites. Some scholars argue that in a new democracy holding
national elections before regional elections generates incentives for the
creation of national, rather than regional, political parties – and hence
that the ideal process of election timing is to start at the national level
first and then work one’s way down.2 Others, such as Diamond, believe
that simultaneous national and local elections ‘‘can facilitate the mutual
dependence of regional and national leaders. The more posts that are
filled at the regional and local level . . . the greater the incentive for re-
gional politicians to coordinate their election activities by developing an
integrated party system.’’3 This was the situation at Indonesia’s 1999
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elections, with identical party-based ballots being presented to voters at
simultaneous elections for national, provincial, and local assemblies,
which greatly strengthened the nascent party system.
In recent years, however, standard UN practice has been to start at the
local level: rather than leading with national elections, the preferred ap-
proach has been to hold local or municipal elections first, allowing steps
towards democratization to be taken gradually. This approach is partic-
ularly suited to ‘‘state-building’’ elections, which can help develop party
politics from the ground up, as in East Timor and Kosovo. In Afghani-
stan, the Lloya Jirga election process facilitated by the United Nations in
2002 can be seen as performing a similar function. The relative success of
these cases suggests that national elections do not necessarily always
have to be held before local ones. In general, the comparative evidence
indicates that local elections should come first and that a ‘‘bottom-up’’
approach to electoral timing is probably the best way to encourage the
development of party politics and to inculcate voters in the routines of
electoral politics.
A final timing constraint comes not from the domestic realm but from
the approach taken by the international community. International policy-
makers have often viewed elections as a convenient punctuation point in
a peacekeeping mission, which cannot just usher in a new government
but also provide a convenient exit point for international involvement.
Thus Cambodia’s exemplary 1993 election, the culmination of the biggest
UN peacekeeping mission to date, was followed by a rapid departure of
the United Nations and other international forces from Cambodia – a
departure which did little to translate the results of an exemplary elec-
toral process into solidifying a fragile new polity. Soon after, a ‘‘coup’’ by
the ‘‘second’’ prime minister, Hun Sen, against the most popular elected
party, FUNCINPEC, saw Cambodia return to its familiar politics of in-
timidation and authoritarian rule. Elsewhere, rushed elections (for ex-
ample, in Liberia) with little in the way of broader political support have
undermined the legitimacy of the election process, creating further prob-
lems for future democracy-building efforts.
There are, however, powerful pressures, both domestically and inter-
nationally, for early elections to occur as part of the process of state re-
building in post-conflict societies. For one thing, given the risk-averse
nature of the international community when it comes to peacekeeping
commitments, such elections can (as noted above) provide a clear ‘‘exit
strategy’’ for international involvement. But supporting the difficult
process of transforming a poor, traumatized, and war-ravaged society
into a well-functioning democracy requires more than the presence of a
few hundred UN officials for 18 months, with an election at the end. It
means, quite simply, being prepared to invest substantial time and money
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in an open-ended process of social and political development. With the
exception of the Balkans, which benefit from their location in Europe
(and where observers are talking about an international presence in the
region for decades), there are few post-conflict societies anywhere in the
world where international actors have the inclination to pursue such an
open-ended strategy. In most cases, the roving eye of the international
media and the governments of major Western states moves on to other,
more fashionable, issues.
A second-best alternative to such open-ended commitment is not to
rush into immediate elections following a peace deal, but rather to en-
courage local involvement for a few years until some of the basic ele-
ments of a pluralistic party system and a functioning state have been
established. This was the approach taken by the United Nations in both
East Timor and Kosovo, where local leadership forums have been in-
troduced without an electoral process. In East Timor, for example, the
United Nations developed the National Consultative Council, made up of
representatives of East Timor’s government-in-waiting, into a form of
unelected legislature which included representatives of youth, church,
and women’s groups. In Kosovo, as noted earlier, national elections were
postponed in favour of municipal polls, where the stakes are lower and
the responsibilities of elected officials were focused on service delivery
rather than national issues. In both cases the evidence suggests that, by
involving local actors in the process of governing while lengthening the
transition to full-blown national elections, a more mature and responsible
form of party politics has begun to be developed. This approach has
much to recommend it for future operations.
Electoral mechanics
The mechanics of the electoral process can have a profound – and often
profoundly misunderstood – impact on the success or failure of post-
conflict democratization. Electoral mechanics can be divided into two
main areas: the electoral system – that is, the formula by which votes are
converted into seats, including the way ballot papers are laid out and the
structure of electoral districts – and the electoral administration – such as
the electoral management body, the provisions for voter registration,
boundary delimitation, and the like. Between them, these two areas
comprise some of the most important variables influencing the success
or failure of post-conflict elections, and indeed democratization more
generally.
While electoral systems have attracted a voluminous academic liter-
ature, issues of electoral administration remain under-studied by scholars
ELECTIONS IN POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES 119
and underrated in general in terms of their effect on post-conflict polities.
Voter registration, for example, is a perennial area of concern, not least
because nearly all post-conflict elections take place in an environment
where basic census and other records are missing. The construction of a
comprehensive register of voters is thus often a first step in the bureau-
cratic process of state-building. It is also often an enormously time-
consuming, logistically challenging, and resource-intensive process: in
Cambodia, for example, the voter registration period took almost a full
year before the election and demanded huge amounts of time, personnel,
and money. Because electoral districts and polling places are often drawn
and allocated on the basis of voter registration records, this process usu-
ally impacts on these areas too.
However, probably the most important administrative decision con-
cerns the composition of the body managing the elections, and specifi-
cally whether the elections are run by the government of the day or some
form of independent electoral commission is established, and whether
such a body is comprised of political parties or non-partisan civil ser-
vants. The worldwide trend is definitely towards independent electoral
commissions staffed by non-partisan civil servants; indeed, since the
world’s largest democracy, India, adopted this model at independence it
was been widely adopted around the world. However, the influence of
the USA is important here, as the US form of electoral administration is
based around political appointees and party representatives. Many post-
conflict democracies, particularly in Latin America, have adopted this
model. Rafael Lopez-Pintor argues that, when there is no better tradition
or an existing body of widely respected independent civil servants, a
party-based electoral authority may be the only realistic choice.4
However, despite some success cases, the comparative evidence (and,
after the Florida debacle at the 2000 presidential elections, that of the
USA itself) suggests that, in general, independent commissions run by
apolitical civil servants are to be preferred to those comprised of political
parties. Party-based commissions have an almost inevitable tendency to
split along party lines. In Haiti, for example, the Provisional Electoral
Council was made up of representatives of the political parties, but was
also deeply divided along party lines, and internal mistrust and divisions
prevented it from working efficiently.5 In Cambodia, by contrast, a non-
partisan electoral commission was widely seen as one of the outstanding
elements of the entire UN mission. Non-partisan commissions were also a
prominent and successful part of UN missions in Namibia and East
Timor.
The dangers of using party-based electoral administrations was graphi-
cally demonstrated by Indonesia’s transitional elections in 1998. Amid
the flowering of new political movements that often accompanies a dem-
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ocratic opening, a requirement that both the government and opposition
political parties must be represented on the General Elections Commis-
sion (KPU) resulted in a deadlocked and unwieldy body of no less than
53 persons, most of them party representatives (including some in-
dividuals who were also candidates for the election). The result was that,
during the preparation for one of the most important transitional elec-
tions of the 1990s, the body charged with running the elections, the KPU,
became almost completely dysfunctional, being deeply divided along
party lines and unable to take even basic decisions (at one stage, fist
fights broke out between different members of the commission). After
the elections, which were administratively flawed, the Indonesians moved
quickly to discard the party-based KPU and replace it with a much
smaller, non-partisan body of 11 non-party and non-government repre-
sentatives.
Electoral processes also need to be sustainable. While the United Na-
tions plays an important ‘‘vector’’ role in spreading new practices and
technologies, there is a distinction between the ideal electoral technology
and the capacity of a recipient country to handle that technology in a
sustainable manner. A number of internationally financed and run elec-
tions over the past decade have introduced a level of electoral technology
which was clearly unsustainable by the host country, and could not be
replicated in their second, locally run, elections. Cambodia and Mo-
zambique both fall into this category. Highly expensive levels of basic
equipment and staffing are a common problem; an over-reliance on so-
phisticated information technology more suited to a first-world country
than a third-world one is another (a typical example is the use of com-
puterized electoral rolls in countries where electric power is unreliable).
Building a sustainable electoral administration needs to be the overriding
aim in such situations, even where this means using more basic technol-
ogy or equipment. Similarly, donors need to think hard about the relative
merits of funding expensive one-off international election observation
missions (sometimes known as ‘‘electoral tourism’’) versus the longer-
term benefits of directly supporting the domestic electoral administration
and local observer groups. The latter is less glamorous but usually has
a much greater pay-off in actually assisting the consolidation of a new
democracy.
While these and other issues of electoral administration continue to
receive inadequate attention, the design of electoral systems, by contrast,
has long been recognized as one of the most important institutional
choices for any political system. Electoral systems can be purposively
designed to achieve particular outcomes, and serve to structure the arena
of political competition, including the party system. The great potential
of electoral system design for influencing political behaviour is thus that it
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can reward particular types of behaviour and place constraints on others.
This is why electoral system design has been seized upon by many schol-
ars as one of the chief levers of constitutional engineering to be used in
mitigating conflict within divided societies.6 As Lijphart notes, ‘‘If one
wants to change the nature of a particular democracy, the electoral sys-
tem is likely to be the most suitable and effective instrument for doing
so.’’7 As well as their suitability for engineering, electoral rules also serve
to structure the arena of political competition during election campaigns.
This has important behavioural consequences for both voters and candi-
dates. Because elections represent a primary arena of political competi-
tion in many new democracies, and different strategies of cooperation or
antagonism between the players can increase or decrease their prospects
for success, the electoral system is a key mechanism in shaping wider
political practices, and can have an effect far beyond the elections them-
selves.
Electoral systems also have a direct impact upon politics in societies
divided along ethnic, religious, ideological, or other lines. Donald Hor-
owitz, for example, argues that ‘‘the electoral system is by far the most
powerful lever of constitutional engineering for accommodation and
harmony in severely divided societies, as indeed it is a powerful tool for
many other purposes’’.8 Arend Lijphart says that ‘‘the electoral system
has long been recognized as probably the most powerful instrument for
shaping the political system’’.9 Timothy Sisk writes that electoral systems
‘‘play an important role in ‘engineering’ the results of democratic voting,
and along with other institutional choices can have a profound impact on
the nature of political parties and the general character of democracy’’.10
Beyond this consensus on the importance of electoral systems, however,
there is profound disagreement among theorists as to which electoral
systems are most appropriate for divided societies.
Two schools of thought predominate. The scholarly orthodoxy has long
argued that some form of proportional representation (PR) is all but es-
sential if democracy is to survive the travails of deep-rooted divisions.
For example, Arthur Lewis’s study of the failure of post-colonial democ-
racy in countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone in the late
1950s and 1960s prompted him to argue that divided societies need PR to
‘‘give minorities adequate representation, discourage parochialism, and
force moderation on the political parties’’.11 Such arguments fore-
shadowed, in part, the electoral recommendations of ‘‘consociational’’
approaches to managing ethnic cleavages in divided societies, which em-
phasize the need for divided societies to develop mechanisms for élite
power-sharing if democracy is to be maintained. In terms of electoral
systems, consociationalists argue that some form of proportional repre-
sentation is all but essential for divided societies, as this enables all po-
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litically significant ethnic groups, including minorities, to form ethnically
based parties. Their prescriptions for electoral system design often focus
on the need for party-list PR, usually in large districts. This is based on
the tendency of PR to produce multi-party systems, and hence multi-
party parliaments, in which all significant segments of the population can
be represented, and on the empirical relationship between proportional
electoral rules and ‘‘oversized’’ or grand coalition governments, which
are a fundamental feature of the power-sharing approach on which con-
sociationalism is based. The use of large, multi-member electoral districts
is particularly favoured because it maximizes proportionality and hence
the prospects of multiple parties in parliaments, which can then form the
basis of an cross-ethnic government coalition.12 PR election rules are
thus important of themselves – because they are likely to facilitate pro-
portional parliamentary representation of all groups – and also an im-
portant component of wider consociational prescriptions that emphasize
the need for grand coalitions, group autonomy, and minority veto powers.
In contrast to this orthodoxy, an alternative approach sometimes typi-
fied as ‘‘centripetalism’’ maintains that the best way to mitigate the de-
structive effects of ethnicity in divided societies is not simply to replicate
existing ethnic divisions in the legislature, but rather to utilize electoral
systems that encourage cooperation and accommodation between rival
groups, and therefore work to break down the salience of ethnicity rather
than foster its representation in parliament.13 Drawing on theories of
bargaining and cooperation, centripetalism advocates institutional de-
signs which encourage opportunities for dialogue and negotiation be-
tween opposing political forces in the context of electoral competition.
By privileging cooperative campaign strategies with increased prospects
of electoral success, candidates representing competing (and sometimes
violently opposed) interests are presented with incentives to negotiate for
reciprocal support, creating an ‘‘arena of bargaining’’ where vote-trading
arrangements can be discussed.14
Centripetalist approaches advocate the use of electoral rules which
encourage ‘‘vote-pooling’’ and ‘‘preference swapping’’ in order to en-
courage inter-ethnic bargaining and promote accommodative behaviour.
At the core of this approach is the need to make politicians reciprocally
dependent on the votes of members of groups other than their own.15
The most reliable way of achieving this aim, according to proponents of
the centripetal approach, is to offer sufficient electoral incentives for
campaigning politicians to court voter support across ethnic lines. For
example, some electoral models – such as preferential systems like the
alternative vote (in Fiji) or the single transferable vote (Northern Ire-
land) – permit (or even require) voters to declare not only their first
choice of candidate on a ballot, but also their second, third, and sub-
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sequent choices amongst all candidates standing. Parties that succeed in
negotiating preference-trading agreements for reciprocal support with
other parties will be rewarded, thus strengthening moderate voices and
the political centre. This gives them strong institutional incentives both to
engage in face-to-face dialogue with their opponents and to negotiate on
broader policy issues than purely vote-seeking ones. The overall effect is
thus to reorient electoral politics away from a rigid zero-sum game to a
more fluid, complex, and potentially positive-sum contest. The success of
‘‘pro-peace’’ forces at Northern Ireland’s breakthrough 1998 election was
dependent to a significant extent on such vote transfers towards the
moderate middle and away from extremists. Fiji’s transitional 1999 elec-
tion also utilized centripetal procedures, as did the transitional 1990
election in Estonia. Sri Lanka and Papua New Guinea are other exam-
ples of countries in which centripetal electoral systems have or will be
used.
Regardless of whether consociational or centripetal approaches (or
some mixture of the two) are favoured, there is widespread agreement
amongst many scholars that some type of power-sharing government
featuring all significant groups is an essential part of democracy-building
in divided societies. In particular, multi-ethnic coalitions are favoured by
both consociationalist and centripetalists as desirable institutions for
divided societies. This form of the power-sharing model is most often as-
sociated with proportional elections, as PR is the surest way of guaran-
teeing fair results and minority representation. Lewis, for example,
argues that ‘‘one of the advantages of proportional representation is that
it tends to promote coalition government’’.16 Yet the comparative evi-
dence from many cases suggests that power-sharing has been less stable
and less in evidence in post-conflict elections than many scholars would
have predicted. In most cases, moreover, proportional elections have re-
sulted in majority rule: Namibia, Mozambique, and Liberia are all exam-
ples of this. In each case, however, the largest party would probably have
won an even greater majority had alternative institutional designs been
employed.
It is instructive to note that almost all of the major transitional elec-
tions conducted in recent years, including those held under UN auspices,
have utilized some form of PR. In fact, transitional elections in Namibia
(1989), Nicaragua (1990), Cambodia (1993), South Africa (1994), Mo-
zambique (1994), Liberia (1997), Bosnia (1996, 1998, 2000), Kosovo
(2001), and East Timor (2001) were all conducted under proportional
representation rules. In particular, the simplest form of proportional
representation – party-list PR – appears to have become the de facto
norm of UN parliamentary elections. The November 2001 elections in
Kosovo, for example, used a national-list PR system to elect the 120-
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member central assembly. In presidential systems this has usually been
combined with some form of run-off election for the presidency. Only
Haiti in 1995, which used a run-off system for its parliamentary elections,
has deviated from the PR norm (and there, as in Angola, the record
of this system was mixed, to say the least: in Haiti, as in Angola, some
losing candidates trailing after the first round of voting chose to boycott
the second round, thus undermining the legitimacy of the process as a
whole).
As would be expected from their widespread use, PR systems have
many advantages for transitional elections in new democracies: they are
fair, transparent, and provide a clear correlation between votes cast in
the election and seats won in parliament. By bringing minorities into the
process and fairly representing all significant political parties in the new
legislature, regardless of the extent or distribution of their support base,
PR is often seen as an integral element for creating an inclusive and le-
gitimate post-authoritarian regime. But the adoption of such systems for
post-conflict elections has usually been dictated more by administrative
concerns, such as the need to avoid demarcating individual electoral dis-
tricts and producing separate ballot papers for each district, than these
wider political issues. Indeed, in many post-conflict elections national
PR systems are the only feasible way to hold an election quickly, as a
uniform national ballot can be used, no electoral districts need be de-
marcated, and the process of voter registration, vote counting, and the
calculation of results is consequently simplified. In Liberia in 1997, for
example, population displacement and the lack of accurate census data
led to the abandonment of the old system of single-member majoritarian
constituencies in favour of a proportional system with a single national
constituency.
However, national PR systems also have some disadvantages, as they
provide no geographic link between voters and their representatives, and
thus create difficulties in terms of political accountability and responsive-
ness between elected politicians and the electorate. In addition, many
new democracies – particularly those in agrarian societies – have much
higher demands for constituency service at the local level than they do
for representation of all shades of ideological opinion in the legislature. It
has therefore increasingly been argued in Namibia, South Africa, Cam-
bodia, and elsewhere that the proportional systems used at the first tran-
sitional elections should be modified to encourage a higher degree of
geographic accountability – such as by having members of parliament
represent territorially defined districts and service the needs of a con-
stituency. A popular choice in recent years has been for ‘‘mixed’’ elec-
toral systems, in which part of the legislature is elected on a national level
by proportional representation and some is elected at a local level from
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single-member districts, so that both proportionality and accountability
are maximized. For example, the August 2001 elections for East Timor’s
88-member constituent assembly used a mixed system, with 75 of the as-
sembly’s seats elected on a nationwide basis by proportional representa-
tion and 13 seats (one for each district) elected by first-past-the-post.
There are also variations within PR systems that need to be consid-
ered. For example, the precise kind of PR formula used can influence the
extent to which minor parties are represented, or major parties are ad-
vantaged. In Cambodia, the use of a ‘‘Hare’’ divisor at the provincial
level, rather than a ‘‘largest remainder’’ system nationwide, had a major
political effect: minor parties which would have gained seats had one na-
tional constituency been used fell short, while the two major parties – the
Cambodian People’s Party and FUNCINPEC – both gained ‘‘seat bo-
nuses’’ as a result of these (apparently minor) system choices. Overall, an
additional 10 parties would have gained representation had the election
been held on a national rather than a provincial basis.17 In Namibia, by
contrast, a highly proportional national PR system was introduced: with
no legal thresholds in place, a party needed less than 1 per cent of the
vote to gain election.
As such cases suggest, it is impossible to divorce the shape of the party
system, and prospects for post-election power-sharing, from the design of
the electoral system. All three are mutually entwined to a large extent.
For example, different types of electoral formula can encourage or retard
different types of party constellations, and can also influence the extent
to which post-conflict parties are broad-based and moderate entities,
drawing cross-communal support, or whether they are (as in Bosnia)
merely former armies in a new guise – wolves in sheep’s clothing. Pro-
portional representation, while fairly representing all views, can also en-
able small extremist parties to gain crucial footholds in power. In support
of this contention, some comparative studies have found that smaller
‘‘district magnitude’’ – the number of members elected from each elec-
toral district – is the crucial institutional variable in blocking the rise of
‘‘fringe’’ or extremist parties and encouraging the development of a
broad-based party system, suggesting that less proportional systems are
to be preferred.18
Other technical considerations can also have major implications. Take
the case of designing list PR systems for ethnically divided societies: be-
cause such systems can utilize one standard national ballot paper and do
not require electoral districts to be drawn or voter rolls to be demarcated
on a geographical basis, they are by far the simplest system for electoral
administrators – and, arguably, voters – facing first-time elections in new
democracies. But in places like Bosnia, the application of PR has also
been seen to undermine the process of democratization by disengaging
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politicians from voters and, worse, permitting the development of hard-
line nationalist political parties which can achieve electoral success by
making narrow, sectarian appeals to their core ethno-political base.
Indeed, recent Bosnian elections have served to emphasize that under
such conditions the surest route to electoral victory under PR is to
play the ethnic card – with disastrous consequences for the longer-term
process of democratization.
Because of these concerns, the most recent Bosnian elections, in No-
vember 2000, therefore utilized an ‘‘open-list’’ PR system, in which vot-
ers could choose not just between parties but also between candidates
within parties, with the expectation that this would encourage greater
identification with and responsiveness from elected politicians. But – as
any scholar familiar with the use of the same system in the deeply ethni-
cally torn country of Sri Lanka could have advised – this was a risky
move in a divided society where ethnic affiliation remains the primary
basis of voter choice. In Sri Lanka, parties that have attempted to field a
multi-ethnic candidate list have found that such ‘‘open lists’’ can under-
mine, rather than promote, multi-ethnic government: Sinhalese voters
will, if given the chance, deliberately move Tamil candidates placed in a
winnable position on a party list to a lower position. This may well be a
problem which could have afflicted major parties in South Africa as well,
had not the electoral system used been a ‘‘closed’’ list which allowed
major parties such as the ANC and the NP to place ethnic minorities and
women high on their party list. In Bosnia, the 2000 elections saw a wave
of victories for extremist parties and candidates, a wave of victories that
the ‘‘permissive’’ open-list PR electoral system only served to encourage,
as it contained no real incentives for inter-ethnic cooperation or moder-
ation.
Political parties and power-sharing
Transitional democracies, particularly those moving from a deep-rooted
conflict situation, typically have a greater need for inclusiveness and a
lower threshold for the robust rhetoric of adversarial politics than their
established counterparts. Similarly, the stable political environments of
most Western countries, where two or three main parties can often rea-
sonably expect regular periods in office via alternation of power or shift-
ing governing coalitions, are very different from the type of zero-sum
politics which so often characterizes divided societies. This is one of the
reasons that ‘‘winner-take-all’’ electoral systems like first-past-the-post
have so often been identified as a contributor to the breakdown of de-
mocracy in the developing world: because such systems tend to lock out
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minorities from parliamentary representation they can, in situations of
ethnically based parties, easily lead to the total dominance of one ethnic
group over all others.19 Democracy, under these circumstances, can
quickly become a situation of permanent inclusion and exclusion, a zero-
sum game with frightening results.
But there are also distinctive elements of political parties in post-
conflict situations that appear to transcend institutional considerations.
Because of the underdeveloped and deeply divided nature of most post-
conflict societies, elections often have the effect of highlighting societal
fault-lines and hence laying bare very deep social divisions. In such cir-
cumstances, the easiest way to mobilize voter support at election time is
often to appeal to the very same insecurities that generated the original
conflict. This means that parties have a strong incentive to ‘‘play the eth-
nic card’’ or to take hard-line positions on key identity-related issues,
with predictable consequences for the wider process of democratization.
Post-communist elections in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, for example,
resulted in the victory of extremist nationalist parties committed to (and
achieving) the break-up of the federation. The 1993 elections in Burundi,
which were supposed to elect a power-sharing government, instead mo-
bilized population groups along ethnic lines and served as a catalyst for
ethnic genocide a few months later. Similarly, Bosnia’s 1996 and 1998
elections effectively served as ethnic censuses, with parties campaigning
on ethnic lines and voters reacting to heightened perceptions of ethnic
insecurity by electing hard-line nationalists to power, greatly under-
mining the process of democracy-building.
For this reason, scholars and policy-makers alike have frequently
identified the need to build broad-based, cross-regional, and multi-ethnic
political parties in fragile multi-ethnic states, particularly those suscep-
tible to separatist appeals. Horowitz, for example, has consistently advo-
cated the need for broad multi-ethnic parties or coalitions of parties as a
key facilitating factor in avoiding ethnic conflict.20 Similarly, Huntington
argues that fractionalized and ethnically or regionally exclusive party
systems are extremely damaging for democratic prospects and are, con-
sequently, found widely in the failed democracies of the third world.21 A
26-nation study of democracy in developing countries concluded that ‘‘a
system of two or a few parties, with broad social and ideological bases,
may be conducive to stable democracy’’.22 Diamond sums up the pre-
vailing view of many scholars, arguing that ‘‘political parties remain
important if not essential instruments for representing political con-
stituencies and interests, aggregating demands and preferences, recruit-
ing and socializing new candidates for office, organizing the electoral
competition for power, crafting policy alternatives, setting the policy-
making agenda, forming effective governments, and integrating groups
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and individuals into the democratic process’’.23 By contrast, under the
conditions of ‘‘polarized pluralism’’, featuring competition between ex-
tremist movements, the logic of elections changes from one of conver-
gence on median policy positions to one of extreme divergence.24 Politics
becomes a centrifugal game. Such fragmented party constellations are
empirically much more likely to experience violence and the breakdown
of democracy than more moderate multi-partism based on a few ‘‘catch-
all’’ political parties.25
For this reason, there is an increasing focus in the policy world – which
has yet to be adequately digested by scholars – on the need to build
broad-based, programmatic political parties in new democracies, and to
avoid the narrow, personalized, and sectarian parties and party systems
that have undermined so many new democracies. Particularly in societies
split along ethnic lines, cross-regional and multi-ethnic parties that com-
pete for the centre ground appear to be a – and perhaps the – crucial
determinant of broader democratic consolidation and peace-building. For
this reason, new democracies around the globe have, over the past few
years, experimented with a unusual array of institutional approaches
to encourage the development of sustainable political parties and party
systems.
There are several ways of doing this. First, party rules governing the
formation, registration, and campaigning of political parties can be
enacted which encourage parties to be cross-regional and cross-ethnic
in their composition. This was the approached used successfully at
Indonesia’s transitional 1999 elections, where to qualify to compete in the
election political parties must have established a branch structure in more
than half of Indonesia’s 27 provinces, and within each of these provinces
must also have established branches in over half of all regions and mu-
nicipalities. The Indonesian drafters stated clearly that their aim was to
discourage political groups based on ethnicity or region which could form
the basis of secessionist claims, and to encourage the development of
broad-based organizations campaigning on a national platform.26 The
results from the 1999 election were encouraging for these expectations,
as the main electoral contest did indeed appear to take place between
three large cross-regional parties, and the level of ethnic violence asso-
ciated with the elections was much lower than had been feared (although
it appears to be rising again in the post-election period). Variations on
this approach have also been used in several other Asian and West Afri-
can countries.
Second, electoral systems can be designed to enable voters to rank-
order choices between candidates (‘‘preferential voting’’), a process
which has been shown to help sustain centrist parties. This was the ap-
proach used at Northern Ireland’s break-though 1998 ‘‘Good Friday
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agreement’’ elections, which utilized a single-transferable-vote form of
electoral system which enabled voters to indicate secondary choices on
their ballot. Analyses of these elections have found that the use of a
transferable ballot enabled ‘‘pro-peace’’ Republican and Unionist voters
to give their first vote to their communal party, but to transfer their
‘‘secondary’’ votes to pro-agreement non-sectarian parties (thus ad-
vantaging the ‘‘moderate middle’’ of non-ethnic parties). Vote transfers
overwhelmingly flowed from sectarian parties on both sides towards the
pro-agreement but non-sectarian middle.27 Pro-agreement parties on
both sides of the sectarian divide benefited from such vote transfers,
which – among other things – were ultimately crucial in converting a bare
‘‘anti-agreement’’ Unionist voter majority into a bare ‘‘pro-agreement’’
Unionist parliamentary majority. Evans and O’Leary, for example, con-
clude that the principal reason that a workable assembly emerged from
the 1998 elections ‘‘was the adoption, or re-adoption, of the single trans-
ferable vote . . . voters’ lower-order preferences kept the Assembly on-
track by reducing the numbers of seats that the anti-Agreement unionist
parties won in the election’’.28
Third, distribution requirements can be enacted which require parties
or individual candidates to garner specified support levels from across
different regions, rather than just their own. The best-known example of
this type of cross-regional engineering has been in Nigeria. Nigeria’s
February 1999 presidential elections which swept Olesegun Obasanjo to
power took place under laws which contained a so-called ‘‘distribution
requirement’’: instead of the usual majority vote requirement, successful
candidates had to obtain not just a majority of the vote, but also not less
than one-quarter of the vote cast in at least two-thirds of the states of the
federation. The intention behind this kind of distribution requirement –
first introduced in 1979 and since adopted in two other African countries
as well – was to ensure that the winning candidate gained cross-ethnic
support across the country rather than just in one part. Again, a primary
aim was to counter the fissiparious secessionist tendencies that may have
been unleashed by the electoral process under different rules. From the
1999 presidential election, the preliminary evidence is encouraging: Ob-
asanjo ran on a cross-ethnic platform and in fact gained greater votes
outside his own region than within it (precisely because, it appears, he
campaigned on a cross-regional multi-ethnic platform).
Fourth, the ‘‘rules of the game’’ can be constructed in such a way as to
encourage, or require, parties to put forward multi-ethnic lists of candi-
dates, thus encouraging multi-ethnicity within parties. In countries as
varied as Lebanon, Singapore, and South Africa, the ‘‘rules of the game’’
encourage parties to present multi-ethnic candidate lists to the voters. In
Lebanon, for example, election is dependent, at a practical level, on be-
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ing part of a mixed list of candidates representing different religious
groups. In most cases candidates must compete for election against other
members of their own group. Electors choosing between party lists must
thus make their choice on the basis of criteria other than ethnicity. In
Singapore, most MPs are elected from multi-member districts known as
‘‘group representative constituencies’’, which each return between three
and six members from a single list of party or individual candidates. Of
the candidates on each party or group list, at least one must be a member
of the Malay, Indian, or some other minority community. Moving from a
compulsory to a voluntary model of multi-ethnic candidate lists, the
closed-list proportional representation system used in South Africa’s
1994 elections enabled the major political parties voluntarily to adopt a
multi-ethnic candidate composition – thus enabling the major ‘‘black’’
party, the ANC, to place white and coloured members at winnable places
on their candidate list.
Finally, external interventions can be used to try to stimulate the de-
velopment of a meaningful party system where none exists. In Kosovo,
for example, the OSCE has devoted substantial resources to introducing
a network of ‘‘political party service centres’’, which are intended to
support the territory’s nascent political groupings and provide them with
logistical and material assistance and, by implication, move them towards
becoming functioning, policy-oriented political parties rather than the
narrow and personalized vehicles for ethnic extremists that were evident
in Bosnia. The party service centres aim to help strengthen the organiza-
tional capacity of Kosovo’s political parties, and to assist them develop
their policy platforms and prepare for election campaigns. They have a
particular focus on assisting parties that have demonstrated they are via-
ble and have a popular mandate. In Papua New Guinea, which has a
weak and fragmented party system that has destabilized executive gov-
ernment, a new law to tries to strengthen the party system by encourag-
ing newly elected MPs to build stable coalitions in parliament, and
granting the resulting ‘‘parliamentary parties’’ monetary and admin-
istrative support. The laws also provide for a by-election if an MP votes
against his or her own party leader in a parliamentary confidence vote.
Both the Kosovo and Papua New Guinea approaches can be seen as
‘‘top-down’’ inducements to organize and build sustainable parties.
Conclusion
Over the course of the 1990s, elections came to be seen not just as a
means of choosing representatives and changing governments, but as a
form of conflict resolution. While there is no doubt that well-designed
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and implemented elections can play this role, this ‘‘quick-fix’’ approach
to elections in post-conflict situations has created more problems than it
has solved. There have been many elections, often conducted at the be-
hest of the international community, which only served to inflame and
politicize the root causes of conflict.
Democratization is a long-term process of social and political develop-
ment, not a short-term event run by or for the international community.
The impact that external interventions can have on democratization –
particularly in post-conflict situations – is largely limited to the design
and construction of hardy institutions; the provision of adequate security
and infrastructural conditions; a modest input into the norms and rou-
tines of a first election; and assistance with election monitoring. Beyond
that, democracy is a domestic game, and its longer-term outcomes are
very much the preserve of local actors and conditions. International in-
terventions are crucial in putting in place the short-term conditions for a
transition to democratic rule, but their longer-term impacts are necessa-
rily limited.
Given this, the most important contribution that the international
community can make is to help establish coherent and robust political
institutions, rather than to engage in broader attempts at social en-
gineering. Because institutions structure the routines of behaviour in
which political actors engage, they are crucial elements, over the longer
term, in helping to build a moderate and sustainable political culture in
which routines of cooperation and accommodation come to be accepted
as the norm rather than the exception. But such routines have to be al-
lowed to develop organically within a facilitating institutional framework.
The role for the United Nations and other external actors should ulti-
mately be to make sure that such a framework is the best and most ap-
propriate that can be devised. Such a limited focus is necessarily a modest
endeavour – but a worthy one nonetheless.
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